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& In this paper, an attempt is made to identify the socioeconomic characteristics of a community
15that influence the development and management of culture-based fisheries in village reservoirs of
Sri Lanka. Socioeconomic data were collected from 46 agricultural farming communities associated
with 47 village reservoirs in Sri Lanka. Principal component analysis indicated that scores of the
first principal component were positively influenced by socioeconomic characteristics that are favor-
able for making collective decisions. These included leadership of the officers, age of the group, per-
20centage of active members of the group, percentage of kinship of the group, percentage of common
interest of the group, and percentage of participation of the group. The size of the group had a nega-
tive effect on the first principal component. The principal component scores of communities were
positively related to willingness to pay (P< 0.001). The communities with socioeconomic character-
istics favoring collective decision making were in favor of culture-based fisheries. Homogeneity of
25group characteristics facilitated successful development of culture-based fisheries.
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INTRODUCTION
Inland fisheries is increasingly recognized as an important means of
30food security, especially in low-income food deficit countries (Coates,
1995). The human dimension of inland fisheries as a nutritional source
has also been growing in importance (Sipponen & Greboval, 2001). In
Sri Lanka, the inland fishery consists primarily of 170,000 ha of reservoirs
(AmarasingheQ1 & Weerakoon, 2008). There are over 10,000 village reser-
35voirs in Sri Lanka but most of them are less than 100ha in surface area with
a cumulative area of around 39,000 ha. These small village reservoirs are
positioned within well-defined small watersheds and distributed across
the dry zone of the country (Panabokke, 2001) to irrigate agricultural land
(De Silva, 1988). These ancient reservoirs support the rural economy by
40irrigating paddy lands, for grazing grounds for cattle and water buffalo, ani-
mal husbandry, and for subsistence fisheries (Ulluwishewa, 1995). Being a
communal resource, village reservoirs are managed by a village assembly
with the right to utilize these fishery resources (Ulluwishewa, 1995). The
farmers who occupied land irrigated from the reservoirs have a tradition
45of working in groups on various agriculture activities (Siriweera, 1994),
and collective fishing has been under the control of the village irrigation
leader (Ulluwishewa, 1995).
The property rights of village reservoirs are poorly established in Sri
Lanka (Heaney & Stephen, 2001). Successful management of communal
50property resources (Pringle, 1985) must be based on consideration of
human aspects such as individual motivation, characteristics of individuals,
nature of institutional arrangements, interactions among users, the ability
of users to create new arrangements, and the behaviour of regulatory
authorities (Feeny et al., 1996).
55Village reservoirs are considered to be suitable for culture-based fish-
eries (Mendis, 1977; De Silva, 1988, 2001). Culture-based fisheries refer
to capture fisheries that are based on the release of hatchery-reared animals
(FAO 1997). Chinese and Indian major carps are typically stocked when the
reservoirs are full (during the inter-monsoonal rainy season in December–
60January) and harvested 7–9 months later when the water level recedes
during the dry season.
Village reservoirs come under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Development of Sri Lanka and farm organizations have been
established under the Agrarian Services Act No. 58 in 1979, No. 4 in
651991, and Agrarian Development Act No. 46 in 2000. The Act vests
authority to the farm organization to work as a group in agricultural activi-
ties (including inland fisheries). Only a few village reservoirs have been
utilized by individuals to develop culture-based fisheries while many others
are utilized by small groups of farm organizations (De Silva et al., 2006).
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70Sustainability of the group depends on a number of social, economic,
institutional, and technological factors that include: (1) small size of the
user group; (2) closeness of users and the resources; (3) homogeneity
among group members; (4) effective enforcement mechanisms; (5) past
experience of the organization; (6) external support; and (7) strong
75leadership (Agarwal, 2001). Therefore it is important to investigate the
factors that influence effective management of culture-based fisheries. In
this paper, an attempt is made to investigate socioeconomic characteristics
of agricultural communities in relation to the development of culture-
based fisheries in village reservoirs of Sri Lanka, with a view to identifying
80socioeconomic criteria that are important for selecting reservoirs for
culture-based fisheries development.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Selection of Village Reservoirs
This study was carried out in five administrative districts (i.e., Anuradhapura,
85Kurunegala, Hambantota, Monaragala, and Ratnapura) (Fig. 1). These
districts have high numbers of village reservoirs that represent different
social and economic characteristics. Site selection procedures have been
described in detail in Jayasinghe et al. (2005), Wijenayake et al. (2005)
and Kularatne et al. (2008). Forty-seven village reservoirs were selected
90randomly for the analysis based on: (1) reservoir size (<20ha); (2)
water retention time (6 to 11 months); (3) accessibility; (4) available
infrastructure; (5) market status, and (6) willingness to participate in
culture-based fisheries. These reservoirs were located within 46 villages in
29 Divisional Secretariat Divisions.
95Socioeconomic Data Collection
Of the 47 reservoirs studied, only 32 had sufficient water for culture-
based fisheries. Fish were harvested using a 5mm mesh 62m 8.5m seine
net after 7 to 10 months (water level of reservoirs was 0.5 to 1.0m). Data
usable for detailed analyses were obtained from only 23 reservoirs.
100Socioeconomic data were collected using sample surveys in selected
farmer communities. The following three categories were developed based
on the 2002=2003 culture cycle: (1) farmer communities of village reser-
voirs that were stocked and harvested successfully; (2) farmer communities
of village reservoirs which were stocked but were not harvested successfully;
105and (3) farmer communities of village reservoirs which were neither
stocked nor harvested.
Socioeconomics of Culture-Based Fisheries 3
Participatory rapid appraisal and rapid rural appraisal techniques
(Townsley, 1993; Chambers, 1997, 1983) were used to collect primary data
from individuals and community groups. Secondary information was
110extracted from previous research reports, village administrative officer
reports, and resource profiles published by the Divisional Secretariat Divi-
sions. In each of the 46 villages, a sample of households that used the res-
ervoir was selected. Sample size was decided based on the accuracy and
precision of the information collected as well as time allocation for the field
115survey, financial restrictions, and location of the reservoirs. At least 11% of
FIGURE 1 Distribution of reservoir in different administrative districts of Sri Lanka.
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the households in each village were interviewed, resulting in from 10 to 126
households in each village.
Based on the population distribution, 4 to 22 individuals from each
village were interviewed. In addition, group discussions were held in each
120village using participatory and rapid rural appraisals to assess the views of
communities on culture-based fisheries. In most village reservoirs,
culture-based fisheries activities are organized by farm organizations or
aquaculture management committees appointed by farm organizations.
An aquaculture management committee normally consists of around 10
125members. A maximum of 22 households were selected from each village
consisting of almost all of the members of the aquaculture management
committees. The rest of the sample represented individuals from the same
village who did not belong to an aquaculture management committee. Offi-
cials of the farm organizations and the aquaculture management commit-
130tees were interviewed in groups. Interviewing was done by using two sets of
structured, pre-tested questionnaires, one for the officials of farm organiza-
tions and aquaculture management committees and the other for the
general membership. There were questions on characteristics of the
resource system, community, institutions (formal and informal), markets,
135and government intervention in fish production.
Data Analysis
Principal component analysis was used to reduce the observed variables
into a smaller number of principal components that account for most of
the variance in the observed variables. In principal component analysis,
140the number of components extracted is equal to the number of variables
analyzed. The first component is expected to account for a fairly large
amount of the total variance. Each succeeding component will account
for progressively smaller amounts of variance. Although a large number
of components may be extracted in this way, only the first few components
145will be important enough to be retained for interpretation. An Eigen value
represents the amount of variance that is accounted for by a given compo-
nent. In this analysis, we used the eigenvalue-one criterion, also known as
the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960), in which the principal components with
an eigenvalue greater than 1.00 are retained and interpreted.
150Twenty-five socioeconomic characteristics (Table 1) were used to ordi-
nate 46 communities through principal component analysis. Variables
selected first for principal component ordination were Ln (xþ 1) trans-
formed and standardized to reduce non-normality of the data and to mini-
mize variation in sampling units. Based on these 24 variables, 46 farmer
155communities were ordinated to extract principal components. The
variables with greater influence on the first principal component were
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then selected. For further clarification, bubble-scale plots of individual
socioeconomic characteristics were superimposed on the principal compo-
nent plots to identify characteristics with less variability and negligible gra-
160dients across the data set. The bubble plots were also examined to identify
the variable pairs that were correlated with each other. From each of these
inter-related variable pairs, one variable was disregarded. The variables cho-
sen from the above analysis were used to ordinate farmer communities
using principal components analysis. Ordination was performed using
165the Primer (version 5.2.2; Clarke & Gorley, 2001) software package. The
relationship between scores of the first principal component and mean
values of willingness-to-pay for culture-based fisheries of individual farmer
communities was then determined. The mean principal component scores
were compared using one-way ANOVA and the pair-wise comparisons
170between the groups were performed by Scheffe’s test. These analyses were
performed using SPSS (version 14.0.0) statistical software.
Willingness-to-pay was calculated for each community using a
dichotomous-choice method (Gunathilaka, 2003). Each respondent
received a hypothetical cost of stocking for one culture cycle and were
175then asked to state their willingness to pay to guarantee stocking of fish
TABLE 1 List of Socioeconomic Variables Used in PCA
Group Size: Small number is favored for culture-based fisheries
Average education level of officers farm organizations and aquaculture marketing organizations
Average education level of group members
Average age of officers
Average years of service to the farm organization=aquaculture management committee of officers
Average years of experiences in fishery activity of the officers
Leadership of officers (Ranks: 1- very weak, 2- somewhat good, 3- good, 4- very good)
Average age of the group
Equality percentage of young members of the group
Equality percentage of active members of the group
Equality percentage of income of the group (highest percentage of low income)
Equality percentage of wealth of the group (highest percentage of low wealth)
Equality percentage of kinship of the group
Equality percentage of caste of the group
Equality percentage of migrant members of the group
Equality percentage of common interest of the group
Equality percentage of participation to the fishery activity of the group
Equality percentage of political party representation of the group.
Participation rate at the meetings
Average age of community (years)
Average family size of the community
Average number of income-generating activities of the households
Average number of unemployed members of households
Average dependency ratio of the households
Basic living condition of community (housing, water, sanitary, electricity, roads, transport, communication,
getting information; Ranks: 1- weak, 2- good, 3- very good)
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fingerlings with a ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’ answer. A multiple regression approach was
used to identify socioeconomic factors that influenced willingness to pay.
Step-wise multiple regression models were used for selection of the most
important variables for willingness to pay for culture-based fisheries using
180SPSS (version 14.0.0) software. The regression model for willingness to
pay (WTP) is as follows:
WTP¼ b0þb1 AHHþ b2 EHHþ b3 EAHþ b4 UHHþ b5 YRVþ b6 INFþ
b7OLþ b8FOMþ b9AMCþ b10LRAþ b11CBFþ b12SIRþ b13NRþ b14 MINþ
b15MFFþ error
185The explanations for the variables used in the model are described in
Table 2.
RESULTS
Seven variables (education of officers of farm organizations,
educational level, age of officers, age of community, family size, living
190conditions of households, and dependency ratio of households did not vary
across communities (Fig. 2). Two variable pairs (income equality and
wealth equality; caste and kinship) showed similar variability across com-
munities (Fig. 3) so that one of the variables in each pair was disregarded.
Sixteen variables were then used for principal components analysis. The
195first five principal components explained 67% of the cumulative variance
(Table 3). The principal component score plot of the first two principal
components is shown in Figure 4. The first principal component was
positively influenced by socioeconomic characteristics that are favorable
for making collective decisions (leadership of officers, age of the group,
TABLE 2 Explanations for the Variables Used in the Regression
Parameter Variable Description Expected Sign
WTP Willingness to pay for culture-based fisheries
b1 AHH Age of household head (15–65)
b2 EHH Educational level of household head (þ )
b3 EAH Number of economic activities of head of household ( )
b4 UHH Number of unemployed members of head of household (þ )
b5 YRV Years of residence in the village (þ )
b6 INF Availability of sources of information (þ )
b7 OL Land ownership under the reservoir (þ )
b8 FOM Membership of farmer organization (þ )
b9 AMC Membership of aquaculture management committee (þ )
b10 LRA Living in reservoir area ( )
b11 CBF Desire to engage in culture-based fisheries ( )
b12 SIR Socio-institutional risk ( )
b13 NR Natural risk in investment on culture-based fisheries ( )
b14 MIN Monthly income of households (þ )
b15 MFF Member of a fisherman family (þ )
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200percentage of active members of the group, percentage of kinship in the
group, percentage of common interest of the group, percentage of group
participation in the fishery, percentage of the same political party represen-
tation, and participation rate at the meetings) whereas group size had a
negative influence (Table 3). In the second principal component axis, posi-
205tive influence was due to the socioeconomic characteristics of percentage
of income of the group, percentage of migrant members of the group,
and number of unemployed members of households. Negative influences
were the years of service of officers to the farm organization or aquaculture
management committee and percentage of kinship of the group (Table 3).
210The first principal component scores were significantly different (one-way
ANOVA; F2,42¼ 3.508; p< 0.05; Table 4) and pair-wise comparisons
(Scheffe’s test) indicated that the mean value of the scores of the first prin-
cipal component of communities that stocked and harvested successfully
was significantly higher than for communities that neither stocked nor
215harvested successfully (P< 0.05; Fig. 5).
Results of the willingness to pay for culture-based fisheries development
are given in Table 5. The farmer communities that stocked and harvested
successfully recorded the highest percentage of members (80%) who were
willing to contribute to the cost of culture-based fisheries. Fourteen percent
220of them were willing to pay the total cost. Nine communities that stocked
but did not harvest had a similar attitude towards willingness to pay, but
77% of them were only willing to pay less than 25% of the total cost.
The remaining 15 communities that did not stock or harvest cannot be
compared directly with the other two groups because they were not
FIGURE 2 Bubble scale plot of basic living conditions of the 46 rural communities indicating an
example of a sociaoeconomic variable with insignificant variability across the communities.
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225involved with culture-based fisheries activities. A lower percentage (70%)
was willing to pay for culture-based fisheries, although 20% were willing
to bear the total cost.
The principal component scores of communities which are character-
ized by the socioeconomic features of collective decision making are posi-
230tively related to willingness to pay (P< 0.001; Fig. 6). Communities with
socioeconomic characteristics favoring collective decision making were
those that were favorable to culture-based fisheries activities.
FIGURE 3 Bubble scale plots of (A) Income equality and (B) Wealth equality of the 45 rural com-
munities showing an example of a pair of variables with similar variability across the communities.
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TABLE 3 Results of the Principal Component Analysis of 16 Socioeconomic Characteristics in the 46
Communities Studied
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5
Eigenvalue 4.41 2.01 1.81 1.28 1.22
% variance explained 27.5 12.5 11.3 8.0 7.6
% cumulative variance explained 27.5 40.1 51.4 59.4 67.0
Variables
Group size  0.290  0.103 0.171 0.175  0.427
Years of service of officers  0.044  0.464 0.082 0.237 0.256
Years of experiences of officers 0.031 0.248 0.283  0.380 0.466
Leadership of officers 0.317  0.137  0.192  0.075  0.077
Age of the group 0.309 0.050 0.215 0.345 0.171
Percentage of young members of the group 0.226  0.012  0.353  0.085  0.398
Percentage of active members of the group 0.290  0.104  0.317 0.355 0.057
Percentage of income of the group 0.135 0.308 0.438 0.342  0.117
Percentage of kinship of the group 0.283  0.340 0.163 0.084 0.250
Percentage of migrant members of the group  0.059 0.514  0.077 0.123  0.064
Percentage of common interest of the group 0.328 0.055 0.319  0.104  0.216
Percentage of group participation for fishery 0.366 0.174 0.145  0.226  0.175
Percentage of same political party representation 0.284  0.016 0.129 0.282  0.116
Participation rate at the meetings 0.361  0.007  0.195  0.252  0.060
Income generating activities of households 0.166 0.156  0.219  0.091 0.341
Number of unemployed members of households  0.034 0.384  0.356 0.398 0.215
In the first two principal components, most influential variable for principal component scores are
indicated in bold (bold italics – negative influence; bold, non-italics – positive influence). For further
explanations of variables, see Table 1.
FIGURE 4 The score plot of the first two principal components of 16 socioeconomic characteristics of
communities 46 villages.
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Multiple regression models are given in Table 6. Education level of the
farmer and monthly income positively influenced willingness to pay in the
235communities that successfully stocked and harvested village reservoirs.
However living in the reservoir area and desire to engage in culture-based
fisheries activities had negatively influenced on willingness to pay.
In communities with reservoirs that were stocked but not harvested
successfully, the risk of investing in culture-based fisheries was found to
240be a negative relationship with willingness to pay. All other variables had
positive influences on willingness to pay (Table 6).
Farmers that did not stock and harvest fish reservoirs had not engaged
in culture-based fisheries during the study period due to various social,
institutional, political and religious and cultural issues. The educated mem-
245bers of this farming group believed that they or their unemployed family
members should not get involved in culture-based fisheries. The present
analysis also showed negative responses of the educational level of farmers
and the number of unemployed members in the family on willingness to
pay for farmers who had not been involved with stocking and harvesting
250fish (Table 6). Families in the communities with longer periods of
FIGURE 5 Mean values of first principal component scores (SE) based on the 16 socioeconomic char-
acteristics of communities in three categories of reservoirs. The columns with similar letters are not sig-
nificant at 5% probability level (Scheffe’s test).
TABLE 4 Results of One-way Analysis of Variance of First Principal Component Scores
Source of Variation Df Sum of Squares Mean Square F Probability Level
Between groups 2 28.395 14.197 3.508 0.039
Within groups 42 169.983 4.047
Total 44 198.388
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residence in the village were willing to get involved in culture-based fish-
eries, as shown by positive influences on willingness to pay, due to their atti-
tude towards ownership of village reservoirs.
Negative influences of membership on aquaculture management
255committees and socio-institutional risk on the willingness to pay are evident
for the lack of success of community-based fisheries in these reservoirs.
Crop cultivation in paddy fields is an individual activity of farmers who have
their own plot of paddy land. On the other hand, culture-based fisheries
activities are performed as group activities and as such, the absence of
FIGURE 6 Relationship between first principal component scores and willingness to pay for culture-
based fisheries.
TABLE 5 Percentage of Farmers Interviewed in the Three Categories of Communities
Who Expressed Willingness to Pay for Culture-based Fisheries in Village Reservoirs and
Percentages of Those Who Said ‘‘yes’’ for Five Levels of Contribution
Level of
Contribution
Stocked and
Harvested
Stocked but
did not harvest
Did not Stock
nor Harvest
n 347 130 178
Said ‘‘Yes’’ (%) 80 78 70
< 25% 52 77 69
25% 25 10 5
50% 8 5 5
75% 1 0 1
100% 14 8 20
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260group sustainability is a high social and institutional risk on culture-based
fisheries. High monthly income of the farming family was found to be a
positive factor affecting willingness to pay possibly due to their sound econ-
omic status. Obviously members of fisher families have positive influences
on willingness to pay (Table 6).
265DISCUSSION
Village reservoirs of Sri Lanka are multiple use resources with irrigation
as a major use. Other village activities are organized around the reservoir.
Historically, village reservoirs belong to the state or to the temple, but some
may be owned privately (Seneviratne, 1989). Village reservoirs canQ1 be
TABLE 6 Factors Influencing Willingness to Pay for Culture-based Fisheries, as Determined by
Step-wise Multiple Regression Analysis in Three Categories of Reservoirs
Reservoirs Variables Coefficients P-value
Stocked and harvested
successfully
Constant 0.422 0.028
Education level of household head 0.010 0.054
Living in reservoir area  0.099 0.014
Desire to engage in culture-based fisheries  0.497 0.000
Monthly income of households 0.063 0.005
R2¼ 0.366, P¼ 0.000
N¼ 347
Average willingness to pay (LKR)¼ 2354
Stocked but not
harvested
Constant  0.619 0.058
No. economic activities of heads of households 0.055 0.040
Availability of sources of information 0.188 0.006
Membership, aquaculture management committee 0.185 0.003
Desire to engage in culture-based fisheries 0.282 0.000
Risk in investment on culture-based fisheries  0.190 0.010
Monthly income of households 0.114 0.005
R2¼ 0.391, P¼ 0.000
N¼ 130
Average willingness to pay (LKR)¼ 1750.00
Not stocked or
harvested
Constant  0.289 0.068
Education level of household head  0.023 0.019
No. of unemployed heads of households  0.043 0.010
Years of residence in the village 0.004 0.056
Membership, aquaculture management committee  0.201 0.000
Desire to engage in culture-based fisheries 0.370 0.000
Socio-institutional risk  0.111 0.051
Monthly income of households 0.093 0.000
Member of a fisher family 0.500 0.000
R2¼ 0.547, P¼ 0.000
N¼ 178
Average willingness to pay (LKR)¼ 1657.30
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270considered a communal property because only the families living within the
village have the right to utilize resources in a village reservoir (Mills, 1933;
Ulluwishewa, 1995).
Poor people are more dependent on village reservoirs for various liveli-
hood needs and contribute more to the management and conservation of
275those reservoirs through collective actions, which would increase their
productivity and income (Balasubramanian & Selvaraj, 2003).
The present study revealed that the socioeconomic characteristics that
pertain to collective decisions, such as small group size, leadership qualities
of officers, kinship of the community, participation rate in fisheries activi-
280ties and participation rate of regular meetings have a positive influence
on willingness to pay for culture-based fisheries activities in village reser-
voirs. The extent of arable land represents the number of active farmers
associated with each reservoir. According to the Agrarian Development
Act of 2000 (Anon, 2000), there should be at least 25 members in a farmer
285organization (FO). Culture-based fisheries activities were organized by
aquaculture management committees in 53% of selected communities.
Group sizes of aquaculture management committees varied from 5 to 15.
Individual economic benefits are higher when the group size is smaller
than in aquaculture management committees with large group sizes.
290Larger groups are less likely to contribute to collective action than smal-
ler ones (Oliver, 1988). Higher percentages of participatory behavior
depended on the group size, and the size of the user group had a negative
impact on cooperation (Balasubramanian & Selvaraj, 2003). All farmers
who own agricultural land under the reservoir are expected to be present
295at meetings in which decisions related to culture-based fisheries are made.
Since land ownership is through inheritance, the majority of decision-
making at the meeting is supported by kinship patterns.
The present analysis indicated that communities with socioeconomic
characteristics favoring collective decision-making have positive influences
300on willingness to pay for culture-based fisheries activities. This suggests that
willingness to pay can be effectively used as a socioeconomic indicator for
selecting rural communities for the development of culture-based fisheries
in village reservoirs.
Educational levels of the farmers who were involved in successful
305culture-based fisheries was a significant variable which positively influenced
willingness to pay. Skills in book-keeping, establishing links with administra-
tion, marketing and conflict resolution in culture-based fisheries are key
areas in which knowledgeable members can get involved in efficient
culture-based fisheries activities.
310Rural farmers are known to be potentially involved in multiple farm
and non farm activities (Taylor & Yunez Naude, 2000). Between the two
labor intensive peak cultivation seasons, farmers have sufficient time to be
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mobilized in other economic activities (De Alwis, 1983; Murray et al., 2001).
Rain-fed agriculture in low rainfall regions of Sri Lanka is of high risk and
315uncertainty (Tennakoon, 1986). Low rainfall at the beginning of the crop
year and high rainfall in the harvest period affect agricultural production.
Low rainfall does not favor culture-based fisheries activities in the reservoirs
due to insufficient water and high rainfall in the harvesting period may result
in overflow from the reservoir that facilitates escape of stocked fish.
320Due to the uncertainty in rain-fed agriculture, rural farmers are com-
pelled to get involved in many economic activities. Involvement of a house-
hold in many economic activities is an indication of the absence of a fixed
income source. The positive influence of the number of economic activities
of the household on willingness to pay by farmers who had successfully
325stocked and harvested reservoirs could possibly be due to the absence of
a fixed income source. However farmers who had not stocked or harvested
reservoirs successfully were of the opinion that unemployed members
should not get involved in culture-based fisheries. This may be due to
the fact that fishery-related activities are still not socially acceptable
330especially among older members in some rural communities. Rearing-
and-killing fish is not acceptable in the Buddhist religious philosophy,
which is the major religion in rural parts of the country.
School age children do not like to join culture-based fisheries activities as
a member of an aquaculture management committee due to social discrimi-
335nation associated with fish culture. Farmers in the 40–45 years age group
were positively associated with culture-based fisheries. In practice, it is neces-
sary for people living around the reservoir to be involved in culture-based
fisheries. Nevertheless, when there are many people living around the reser-
voir, all of them may wish to become members of the aquaculture manage-
340ment committee resulting in large group sizes. As shown by the present
analysis, such large group sizes negatively influence culture-based fisheries.
In conclusion, the present study indicated that in addition to the biologi-
cal and ecological characteristics of village reservoirs as described by
Jayasinghe et al. (2005) and Wijenayake et al. (2005), socioeconomic hetero-
345geneity in communities and their potential contribution to culture-based fish-
eries that can be quantified using contingent evaluation techniques (Wattage
&Mardle 2005). Although willingness to pay is usually used to value un-priced
environmental goods, these approaches can be used to select communities
and reservoirs for development of culture-based fisheries.
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